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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, an unknown Twitter user created a fake account for 
Anthony La Russa, the manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, at 
twitter.com/TonyLaRussa.1  The user posted “tweets,” or updates, as La 
Russa, a few of which were vulgar and Cardinals–related.2  The page 
also included a photo of La Russa and only one line on the page 
suggested it was fake, as the profile stated: “[b]io [p]arodies are fun for 
everyone.”3  La Russa tried to contact the site to have the phony page 
removed, but was unsuccessful, and filed the first suit of its kind against 
Twitter.4  La Russa’s complaint alleged trademark infringement and 
dilution, cybersquatting, and misappropriation, also known as a 
 
1. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC09488101 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 6, 2009).  
2. Id.   
3. Id.  
4. Id.   
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violation of the right of publicity.5  Hours after the suit was filed, Twitter 
removed the fake page, and the case was eventually settled.6   
Similarly, Ron Livingston, Office Space movie star, recently filed suit 
after an anonymous Wikipedia editor repeatedly altered Livingston’s 
Wikipedia entry so it stated that Livingston was homosexual.7  A fake 
Facebook profile was also created for the actor, again alluding to 
homosexuality; Livingston suspected the individual who edited the 
Wikipedia page also created the profile.8  When the media first reported 
this story, it was known the actor filed suit, but there was much debate 
as to whom he named as the defendant, Wikipedia and Facebook or the 
unknown individual responsible for posting the false information.9  
While the individual responsible for the post would normally be named 
as a defendant for a right of publicity violation regardless of Twitter’s 
liability, in this instance, that person was unknown; thus, making it 
plausible that Livingston would seek restitution against Twitter.   
This debate occurred because of the lack of uniformity between the 
Circuit Courts as to how a particular provision, the intellectual property 
exemption, in the Communications Decency Act (CDA) should be 
interpreted.  One circuit has held that the intellectual property 
exemption under the CDA only includes federal intellectual property 
rights, like copyright and trademark, while other circuits have held that 
the intellectual property exemption under the CDA includes both 
 
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. David Kravets, Office Space Actor Sues Anonymous Wikipedia Vandal, WIRED 
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/livingston. 
8. Id.   
9. Tanya Roth, Ron Livingston Wikipedia Suit: Is Calling Someone Gay Defamation?, 
FIND LAW (Dec. 9, 2009), http://blogs.findlaw.com/celebrity_justice/2009/12/ron-livingston-
wikipedia-suit-is-calling-someone-gay-defamation.html.  When the story first emerged, two 
websites, UPI and Techdirt, reported Livingston sued Wikipedia and Facebook, while three 
different websites, PerezHilton, Wired, and Copyrights & Campaigns, stated that he sued the 
individual responsible for the post.  Id.; see also Perez Hilton, Office Space Star Sues Internet 
Troll for Calling Him Gay!, PEREZ HILTON (Dec. 6, 2009), http://perezhilton.com/2009-12-
06-office-space-star-sues-internet-troll-for-calling-him-gay.  Since these articles first emerged, 
the complaint has become public and shows that Mr. Livingston actually filed suit against the 
anonymous individual.  Complaint, Coupleguys, Inc., v. Doe, No. BC427389 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 
4, 2009).  It is worth noting that this case was filed in the Superior Court of the State of 
California.  Since California is in the Ninth Circuit, it would follow the holding of Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007), which has construed the CDA to limit the 
term intellectual property to federal intellectual property.  Therefore, the right of publicity 
would not fall under the exception provided in the CDA, and internet service providers 
(ISPs), such as Wikipedia or Facebook, could not be held liable for the violation of a person’s 
right of publicity.  Therefore, because of the current Ninth Circuit stance, the case was filed 
against John Doe, rather than against Wikipedia or Facebook.   
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federal intellectual property rights and state intellectual property rights, 
like the right of publicity.   
A resolution of this jurisdictional split is important.  If the 
intellectual property exemption under the CDA includes only federal 
intellectual property rights, then an individual whose right of publicity 
has been violated by another party posting on a website, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, or Wikipedia, may only seek restitution against the 
individual who posted the content.  On the other hand, if the intellectual 
property exemption under the CDA includes both federal intellectual 
property rights and state intellectual property rights, then an individual 
whose right of publicity has been violated by another party posting on a 
website, such as Twitter, Facebook, or Wikipedia, may seek restitution 
against both the individual who posted the content and the internet 
service provider (ISP), Twitter, Facebook, or Wikipedia.   
This Comment will demonstrate that a state law right of publicity 
claim should be included in the intellectual property exception of the 
CDA, and thus, individuals like Tony La Russa and Ron Livingston 
should be able to seek redress for violations of their rights of publicity 
from ISPs, like Facebook, Twitter, and Wikipedia.  Part II will explain 
the development of the right of publicity.  Part III will detail the 
legislative history of the Communications Decency Act.  Part IV will 
propose two possible reasons why the CDA carved out an exception for 
intellectual property rights.  Part V will contain an examination of the 
case law that has caused the jurisdictional split as to whether the right of 
privacy and other similar state intellectual property rights fall under the 
intellectual property exception of the CDA.  Finally, Part VI will 
conclude by demonstrating that according to the plain language of the 
statute and the proposed purposes, the right of publicity should be 
included in the intellectual property exemption of the CDA. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY  
The right of publicity, a state law claim, is a person’s legal right to 
control the exploitation of their name and likeness.10  The right 
“prevents unjust enrichment by providing a remedy against exploitation 
of the goodwill and reputation that a person develops in his name or 
likeness through the investment of time, effort, and money.”11  As the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains, the right 
“appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using 
 
10. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE 
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 263 (2003).   
11. Bi-Rite Enter., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).   
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without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity 
for the purpose of trade.”12   
The notion of the right of publicity arose in the American legal 
community as a result of three pivotal law review articles.13  It was not 
until sixty-three years after the publication of these articles, in 1953, that 
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals coined the term 
“right of publicity.”14  The Supreme Court recognized the right of 
publicity in 1977, as it noted the following different motivations behind 
the right of privacy and the right of publicity: economic interests drive 
the right of publicity, while privacy protections drive the right of 
privacy.15   
Cases involving the right of publicity typically involve a celebrity 
plaintiff.  However, courts are split as to whether being a celebrity is a 
prerequisite to bringing a right of publicity claim.  Some courts have 
found right of publicity is restricted to celebrities.16  On the other hand, 
the majority of courts have found that non-celebrities are allowed to 
recover for a violation of their right of publicity if there is proof that the 
individual’s identity possesses some economic value.17  Therefore, for 
 
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).   
13. Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *3 (S.D.W.Va. 
Feb. 14, 2008).  The right to privacy, from which the right of publicity seemingly grew out of, 
first received widespread recognition as a result of Samuel Warren and Louise Brandeis’s 
article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  The article states, “the right to life 
has come to mean the right to enjoy life, — the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures 
the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every 
from of possession—intangible, as well as tangible [emphasis added].”  Id.  (emphasis added).  
Though the right of publicity was not specifically mentioned in this article, it set the stage for 
Dean Prosser to later break the right of privacy into four distinct torts.  The four torts 
comprising the right of privacy, as suggested by Prosser in his article, Privacy, include the 
following: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, (2) publication of private facts, (3) false 
light, and (4) misappropriation of one’s name or likeness.  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).  The fourth privacy tort was further defined by Prosser as the 
“exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff’s identity,” or more commonly known today as the 
right of publicity.  Id. at 401.  Finally, in Melville Nimmer’s seminal article, The Right of 
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954), he attempted to define the parameters of 
the right of publicity, stating that the right should be available to everyone, not just limited to 
celebrities, and should be recognized as a property right, not a personal right, so it may be 
assigned and subsequently enforced by the assignees.   
14. Haelan Labs. Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).   
15. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).   
16. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1983); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 
F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 
1984); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982); 
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 10, at 268. 
17. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 953 (6th Cir. 2003); see Tellado v. 
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one to invoke the right of publicity, the individual must have attained 
some degree of “celebrity status,” meaning their identity has an 
economic value that needs protection.   
The right has expanded and evolved over time into one the courts 
typically classify as an intellectual property right.18  The right originated 
from state statutes and common law, and there is no federal 
equivalent.19  Currently, nineteen states have statutes that define a right 
of publicity and twenty-eight others recognize a common law right of 
publicity.20  The Restatement outlines the elements of the prima facie 
case, which require the plaintiff to establish: 
 1. Validity.  Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or 
 persona of a human being; and  
 2. Infringement 
  (A) Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of  
  identity or persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable  
  from defendant’s use; and  
  (B) Defendant’s use is likely to cause damage to the 
commercial  
  value of that persona.21 
While these elements are typical of what one would need to prove for a 
successful right of publicity claim, it should be noted that the elements 
might vary from state to state.   
 
Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986); Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 459 N.E. 2d 507, 
509 (Ohio 1984); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 75 (N.J. 1967); J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4.3 (2d ed. 2003); SCHECHTER & 
THOMAS, supra note 10, at 268; see also Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 
1988).  In 1987, Life magazine tried to sell a famous picture of a sailor, the plaintiff, kissing a 
nurse on V-J Day for $1600 each.  Id. at 968.  The sailor in the picture brought an action 
against the magazine for “misappropriation of likeness.”  Id.  The court denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because of the commercial nature of 
the sale.  Id. at 973.  Commentary on this case suggests that the holding demonstrated the 
court’s emphasis on the commercial use of one’s name or likeness, regardless of whether the 
individual was celebrity.  See id.  However, it can be argued the sailor had achieved some 
level of celebrity status, as the initial publication of the picture occurred on August 27, 1945, 
and by the time the suit was brought, the image of the sailor in the photograph was very “well 
known.”  Id. at 968.   
18. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:1. 
19. Id. § 6:135.   
20. Statutes, RIGHTOFPUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Sept. 
24, 2010). 
21. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:1; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).   
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II.  THE CDA AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY  
Congress passed the CDA as Title V of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996.22  The CDA was primarily passed to protect minors from 
exposure to obscene and indecent material on the Internet, as the 
legislative body was “troubled by an increasing number of published 
reports of inappropriate uses of telecommunications technologies to 
transmit pornography, engage children in inappropriate adult contact, 
terrorize computer network users through ‘electronic stalking’ and seize 
personal information.”23  However, the CDA provisions regulating 
pornographic content were subsequently struck down as 
unconstitutional.   
The second reason the CDA was passed, as emphasized by both the 
House and Senate, was to overrule Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services, which treated ISPs as publishers or speakers of the content 
posted on their sites.24  In Stratton Oakmont, the defendant hosted 
“Money Talk,” the country’s top financial message board at that time.25  
An anonymous user posted statements on “Money Talk” alleging 
criminal and fraudulent behavior by Stratton Oakmont, Inc. and 
Stratton’s president, Daniel Porush.26  Originally, Prodigy advertised it 
“exercised editorial control” over the message board, but by the time 
the defamatory comments were posted, Prodigy changed its policies.27  
Regardless, Stratton claimed that Prodigy edited the contents on its 
message boards in a way that rendered the company a publisher for 
liability purposes.28  The court determined Prodigy exercised sufficient 
editorial control over the message board to qualify as a publisher.  As a 
result, this decision imposed the same responsibilities on ISPs as 
newspapers, making them liable for the statements posted on their 
message board.29  The court found that “[b]y actively utilizing 
technology and manpower to delete notes from its computer bulletin 
boards on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste,’ for example, 
P[rodigy] is clearly making decisions as to content . . . and such decisions 
constitute[d] editorial control,” and thus, Prodigy was operating as a 
 
22. 47 U.S.C § 230 (1996).   
23. See S. REP. NO. 104–23, at 59 (1995).     
24. See H.R REP. NO. 104–458, at 194 (1996)(Conf. Rep.).   
25. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y.Sup. 
May 24, 1995).   
26. Id.   
27. Id. at *2–3.   
28. Id. at *3.  
29. Id. at *4.   
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publisher.30   
At the same time, while drafting the CDA, Congress was also 
concerned with ensuring the continued development of the Internet.31  
The legislative body recognized the speed at which information could be 
distributed and the near impossibility of regulating information content.  
It also saw a great opportunity for greater “availability of educational 
and informational resources.”32  Congress believed the Internet could 
provide “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique 
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity.”33  Accordingly, when writing the statute, Congress 
aimed “to promote the continued development of the Internet” and 
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” that the Internet 
created.34   
The legislative history of the CDA shows that Congress thought 
ISPs were the best entities to manage content on the Internet and 
specifically, their websites.35  As a policy decision, Congress chose, 
“[w]hether wisely or not . . . to effectively immunize providers of 
 
30. Id.    
31. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).  While various policy options were available to 
Congress, it chose to “promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media” and “to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market” for such service, largely “unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) , (2).  In § 230(a), Congress explicitly listed the five 
reasons why it granted immunity to ISPs.  They are as follows:  
 “(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services  
 available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability  
 of educational and informational resources to our citizens.  (2) These services offer 
users  
 a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential  
 for even greater control in the future as technology develops.  (3) The Internet and 
other  
 interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political disclosure,  
 unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual  
 activity.  (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to 
the  
 benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulations.  (5) Increasingly  
 Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, 
cultural,  
 and entertainment services.”   
47 U.S.C. § 230(a).   
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1).   
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).   
34. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2).   
35. Adam M. Greenfield, Despite a Perfect 10, What Newspapers Should Know About 
Immunity (And Liability) for Online Commenting, 4 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 453, 461–
62 (2008).   
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interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to 
material disseminated by them but created by others.”36  Thus, Congress 
decided not to treat ISPs in the same manner as traditional publishers, 
such as newspapers, magazines, television, or radio stations; all of which 
may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory 
material written or prepared by others.  Further, in its legislative 
decision-making, Congress opted not to hold ISPs liable for their failure 
to edit, withhold, or restrict access to offensive material distributed 
through their websites.   
Congress’s decision to immunize ISPs and their objection to Stratton 
Oakmont is most clearly seen in § 230(c) of the CDA, the “Good 
Samaritan” subsection.  This subsection states “[n]o provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”37  The term “information content provider” is defined as “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
or development of information provided through the Internet.”38  
Therefore, under the “Good Samaritan” provision, ISPs such as 
Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, etc., are not treated as publishers of 
information posted on their sites by their members, the information 
content providers.   
However, the CDA goes on to state, “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property,”39 but does not define “intellectual property” anywhere in the 
Act.  Federal intellectual property law claims for infringement of 
copyrights, trademarks, and patents are clearly exempted from this 
section.  However, Congress made no mention in the legislative history 
as to whether it intended to view state law claims, like the right of 
publicity, as intellectual property claims or tort claims.40  One court has 
concluded that the CDA only grants immunity for ISPs for tort-based 
negligence claims arising from the acts of their users.41  According to the 
 
36. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).    
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 
(4th Cir. 1997).   
38. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006).   
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).   
40. Ian C. Ballon, The Good Samaritan Exemption and the CDA, 978 PLI/ PAT 515, 
564 (2009).   
41. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Gucci 
brought a suit against Mindspring, an ISP for trademark infringement.  Id. at 411.  Mindspring 
argued that the CDA precluded the company from liability for the information posted on 
their own website.  Id.  The court distinguished this case from others that successfully invoked 
§ 230 as a defense because those cases were based in tort law.  Id. at 415.  Therefore, the court 
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Gucci court, the Act does not grant immunity for any state law 
intellectual property claims.   
III.  PURPOSE OF THE CDA 
In the congressional findings, Congress noted that the Internet offers 
“unique opportunities for cultural development” and has been 
increasingly relied on by Americans for “a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”42  While Congress 
decided it was beneficial for the development of the Internet to 
immunize ISPs from the liabilities imposed on publishers, it specifically 
removed ISPs’ protection for the violation of “any law pertaining to 
intellectual property.”43  But why did this legislative body carve out an 
intellectual property exemption to the general rule?  Unfortunately, this 
question cannot be answered by looking at the legislative history of the 
Act.   
The issue of ISP liability was convoluted and uncertain at the time 
Congress passed the CDA.  In 1991, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 
CompuServe hosted an online news forum.44  The contents of the forum 
were “manage[d], review[ed], create[d], delete[d], edit[ed], and 
otherwise controll[ed]” by an independent party.45  One particular 
forum, Rumorville USA, a daily newsletter, published content about a 
competing online newsletter developed by Cubby.46  Cubby asserted that 
the contents were defamatory, and while CompuServe did not disagree, 
it argued it should not be held liable because it was only a distributor of 
that information and did not know and had no reason to know of the 
posting.47  The court agreed with CompuServe and held that 
CompuServe was a distributor rather than a publisher of the content, 
and thus, it should only be held liable for defamation if it knew or had 
reason to know of the defamatory nature of the statements.48  Through 
this finding, the court seemingly held that ISPs were subject to 
traditional defamation law for content posted on their websites.   
Stratton Oakmont, as discussed above, pointed out that if 
 
found that the CDA did not give Mindspring immunity from Gucci’s trademark claim 
because the claim was rooted in intellectual property.  Id.; see also Universal Commc’n Sys., 
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).   
42. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (5).   
43. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).   
44. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).   
45. Id.  
46. Id.   
47. Id. at 141. 
48. Id. 
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distributors of information knew, or should have known, about the 
defamatory statements, they would be held liable.49  The court 
distinguished this case from Cubby as it found that ISPs were no longer 
merely distributors of information when they exercised editorial control, 
and as a result should be treated as the publisher of the information.50   
In its legislative history, Congress specifically mentioned it sought to 
overturn Stratton Oakmont.  In doing so, it recognized that Cubby and 
Stratton Oakmont created a seemingly impossible situation for ISPs.  If 
ISPs knew, or should have known, content on their sites was defamatory 
they would be held liable, and if they edited their sites for such content 
and missed certain postings or statements, they would still be considered 
publishers of that information and held liable.  The CDA was 
Congress’s response to dealing with this dilemma.  
One possible explanation why Congress may have created the 
intellectual property exemption under the CDA was to address issues of 
defamation on the Internet, but leave intellectual property rights alone.  
Congress may have recognized that copyrights and trademarks had 
established precedent in the area of secondary liability.  Under these 
secondary liability doctrines, such as contributory liability and vicarious 
liability for copyright law, ISPs could be held liable for violations posted 
on their sites.  By leaving intellectual property exempted from the 
provisions of the CDA, Congress was creating law consistent with the 
established precedent by still holding ISPs liable for intellectual 
property violations posted on their sites.  Thus, while ISPs needed 
immunity stemming from defamatory comments posted on their 
websites, there was no need to change the already established 
intellectual property laws.   
Another possible reason Congress provided the intellectual property 
exception might have been to continue to protect creators of intellectual 
property.  The purpose behind intellectual property rights is primarily 
economic.  The traditional view of intellectual property rights is “as 
instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges on 
individuals solely for the purpose of contributing to the greater public 
good.”51  These rights provide financial incentives to individuals who 
create intellectual property. 
 
49. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y.Sup. 
May 24, 1995).   
50. Id. at *4.   
51. Barton, J., Alexander D., Correa, C., Mashelkar, R., Samuels, G., Thomas, S. et al. 
(2002). IntegratingIntellectual Property Rights and Development Policy. Resource document. 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf. 
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Congress may have destroyed this immunity in order to, 
metaphorically speaking, keep from pulling out the rug on those that 
own intellectual property rights.  In order for these economic gains to be 
felt by the creators and owners of intellectual property rights, these 
rights need to be enforced; if there is no longer an economic gain, this 
may have a very serious chilling effect on the creation of intellectual 
property.  If ISPs are immune from liability, the likelihood of them 
monitoring for violations of intellectual property rights seems slim to 
none.  By taking away their immunity, ISPs have an incentive to closely 
monitor for these offenses.  While Congress may not have had the same 
concern for individuals that are defamed, by including the intellectual 
property exemption in the CDA, the legislative body seemed to 
recognize the importance of preserving the already established 
intellectual property rights and the financial incentives they create.   
IV. EXAMINING THE JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT AS TO WHETHER § 
230(E)(2) OF THE CDA INCLUDES BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW  
Jurisdictions are split as to whether “intellectual property” under § 
230 includes just federal intellectual property law, or is broad enough to 
include both state and federal intellectual property law.  The Ninth 
Circuit emphasized the lack of uniformity between state intellectual 
property laws and determined the CDA only includes federal 
intellectual property laws.52  Conversely, district courts in New 
Hampshire and southern New York sharply criticized this approach and 
focused on the language of the Act to determine whether § 230(e)(2) 
includes both state and federal intellectual property law.53  This is 
significant because in situations where courts have determined the CDA 
only includes federal intellectual property rights, like the Ninth Circuit, 
ISPs cannot be held liable if users of their website violate another 
person’s right of publicity.  In contrast, in situations where courts have 
determined the CDA includes both state and federal intellectual 
property claims, like the district courts in New Hampshire and southern 
New York, ISPs are no longer immune from right of publicity claims 
and may be held liable.   
 
52. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007). 
53. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299–300 (D.N.H. 2008); 
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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A. The Argument that “Intellectual Property” Under § 230 (e)(2) of the 
CDA Only Includes Federal Intellectual Property Law 
In the 2007 Ninth Circuit Case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, the 
plaintiff, Perfect 10, published an adult entertainment magazine and was 
the owner of the subscription website perfect10.com.54  The website 
featured images of models, created by the company, that were only 
accessible to registered, paying members.55  Many of the models signed 
releases assigning their rights of publicity to Perfect 10.56  Additionally, 
the company held copyrights for the images and owned several related 
trademarks and service marks.57  The plaintiffs asserted that the 
defendants violated copyright, trademark, state law claims of violation 
of the right of publicity, unfair competition, and false and misleading 
advertising laws by providing services to websites that posted images 
stolen from Perfect 10’s magazine and website.58   
The court found that the term “intellectual property” was limited to 
“federal intellectual property.”59  The court noted that state intellectual 
property laws, such as the right of publicity, are not consistent with 
federal intellectual property laws because of their lack of uniformity.60  
It further stated:  
 Because material on a website may be viewed across the  
 Internet, and thus in more than one state at a time, permitting the  
 reach of any particular state’s definition of intellectual property 
to  
 dictate the contours of this federal immunity would be contrary 
to  
 Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development of the  
 Internet from the various state–law regimes.61   
The court seemingly concluded that because of the lack of uniformity 
between states and lack of clarification of the term “intellectual 
property” in the CDA, the only reasonable way to construe the 
language of § 230 would be to limit intellectual property to federal 
intellectual property.62  Therefore, it found the defendants were eligible 
 
54. Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1108.  
55. Id.   
56. Id.   
57. Id.   
58. Id.   
59. Id. at 1119. 
60. Id. at 1118.   
61. Id.  
62. See id.   
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for CDA immunity for the state right of publicity claim brought by 
Perfect 10.63   
B. “Intellectual Property” Under § 230 (e)(2) of the CDA Includes Both 
State and Federal Intellectual Property Law 
In the 2008 case, Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., a New 
Hampshire district court expressly declined to follow Perfect 10 and 
adopted dicta from the First Circuit64 holding that state publicity claims 
were not preempted by § 230.65  The defendant corporation operated a 
number of “web communities” where users met each other through 
online personal advertisements.66  A false profile was created for a 
member that contained a variety of information on her sexual 
proclivities, and other information such as birth date, height, build, hair 
and eye color, and submitted a nude photograph, purportedly of 
herself.67  The plaintiff did not learn of the profile until more than a year 
after its creation.68  After being contacted, the defendants said they 
would take down the profile; but instead of taking it down, they put up 
language stating that the profile had been removed.  This language 
made no indication that the profile was false to begin with.69  For several 
months after the initial complaint, the profile showed up on other 
similar websites operated by the defendants.70  To make matters worse, 
the profile appeared as advertisements on third party websites, 
including sexually related sites.71  The plaintiff brought eight counts 
against the defendants, including a right of publicity claim.72   
The court stated the analysis of the statute should begin with its 
language, and the language did not suggest intellectual property was to 
be limited to federal intellectual property.  It criticized the Ninth 
Circuit’s lack of statutory interpretation, in particular, its disregard for 
the presence of the term “any” and the absence of the term “federal” in 
the statute.73  The court noted, “[i]t is well settled that where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
 
63. Id. at 1119.   
64. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).   
65. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008).   
66. Id. at 291.   
67. Id. at 292. 
68. Id. 
69. Id.   
70. Id.  
71. Id.   
72. Id. at 293.   
73. Id. at 300.   
250 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress 
did so intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”74  The court also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit failed to 
look at the rest of § 230, as the statute contains other provisions that 
specifically identify whether federal or state law applies.75  Finally, the 
court found that Perfect 10 failed to address any particular instances 
where the state’s definition of intellectual property went beyond the 
scope of federal law, or how state intellectual property law varied so 
drastically between states, thus making this argument “shaky at best.”76  
The court found the facts presented were sufficient to state a claim for 
infringement of the plaintiff’s right to publicity.77  Therefore, the 
defendants could still be liable for the fake profile posted on their 
website. 
Likewise, in 2009, in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, 
Inc., the Southern District of New York rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding and found the CDA did not bar the plaintiff’s New York state 
law copyright claims.78  The defendant operated a website that provided 
an index of songs available on third-party websites.79  Users could create 
playlists of the songs on the website, upload the songs to their profiles 
on social networking sites, or download the songs from the third-party 
websites.80  The plaintiffs owned the copyrights to many of the songs the 
defendants provided links to.81  The songs were posted without the 
plaintiff’s permission, and thus, the court found copyright 
infringement.82   
The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s state common law 
copyright infringement claims alleging the claims were barred by the 
CDA.83  The court reasoned the same way as Friendfinder, and found 
 
74. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 553 U.S. 167, 173 (2001)).   
75. Id. at 299-300.   
76. Id. at 301.   
77. Id. at 306.    
78. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009).  Today, federal copyright law expressly preempts most state copyright laws; yet before 
1972, sound recordings were protected only under state copyright law.  The plaintiff in this 
case was suing to enforce those state rights.  Eric Goldman, 230 Doesn’t Preempt State IP 
Claims—Atlantic Records v. Project Playlist, TECHNOLOGY & MARKET LAW BLOG (Apr. 
2009) http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/04/230_doesnt_pree.htm. 
79. Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 692.   
80. Id. at 692–693.   
81. Id. at 693.   
82. Id.   
83. Id. at 698.   
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that “any law” was not just limited to federal law.84  Additionally, the 
court noted four different places in § 230(e) where Congress specified 
whether it intended local, state, or federal law to apply and pointed out 
the absence of such language in this instance.85  The court found this 
indicated that “any law” included both state and federal law, as 
Congress clearly knew how to make the distinction but chose not to.86  
The court also struck down the defendant’s argument that all state laws 
relating to intellectual property are preempted by § 230(e)(2),87 because 
those laws are inconsistent with the CDA.88  It found § 230(e) provided 
states with the authority to enforce any state law consistent with the 
CDA.89  Since the defendant did not demonstrate the state law claims 
were inconsistent, its argument could not be upheld.90  The court held 
the plain language of the CDA made it clear that §230 (e)(2) does not 
provide immunity for either state or federal intellectual property law.91  
Therefore, the court concluded that the CDA did not provide immunity 
for federal or state intellectual property claims and the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss was denied.92   
V. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF § 
230(E)(2) DEMONSTRATE THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY SHOULD FALL 
UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXCEPTION OF THE CDA 
Courts should follow Friendfinder and Atlantic Recording Corp. and 
treat the right of publicity as an intellectual property right under § 230 
of the CDA.  The language of the statute states, “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property.”93  The plain language of the Act, along with the 
proposed purpose of the Act, speaks to the inclusiveness of state 
intellectual property rights under § 230(e)(2).   
Here, both New York and New Hampshire District Courts have 
clearly pointed out that the statute is unambiguous.  First, a statute is 
 
84. Id. at 703.   
85. Id. 
86. See id.   
87. “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any 
State law that is consistent with this section.  No cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  
47 U.S.C. § 230 (e)(3) (2006).   
88. Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
89. Id. 
90. Id.  
91. Id. at 704.   
92. Id.  
93. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (emphasis added).   
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ambiguous if a reasonably well-informed person can interpret it in more 
than one way.94  And the term “any” allows for a broad interpretation of 
the statute and can be defined as “every.”95  As a result, any person that 
is reasonably well-informed of the definition of the word “any” could 
not interpret the statute in more than one way; there is no ambiguity in 
this term, and therefore, should included both federal and state law.  
Second, as courts have pointed out, Congress uses the words local, state, 
and/or federal in subsection (e), to limit the application of other 
subsections of the CDA, but fails to use any limiting term in subsection 
(e)(2).  Third, § 230 allows for state laws consistent with the CDA, and 
based on the purpose of the Act, as described in § 230(a), there is no 
indication that a state right of publicity claim would be inconsistent with 
this purpose.  In conclusion, since the plain meaning of the word “any” 
is broad and inclusive of all types of law, Congress failed to use a 
limiting word such as local, state, or federal in the subsection, and a 
state law right of publicity is not indicative of any inconsistencies with 
the CDA, the plain meaning of the statute clearly shows a state law right 
of publicity claim should be included under the intellectual property 
exemption of § 230(e)(2).   
Under the plain meaning rule, if “the intention of the legislature is 
so apparent from the face of the statute that there can be no question as 
to its meaning, there is no room for construction.”96  As both the New 
York and New Hampshire District Courts made clear, convincing 
arguments that the Act is unambiguous and because of the plain 
meaning, the canons of construction analysis need not go any further.   
However, if this analysis is not fully convincing, in addition to the 
plain language of the statute, the proposed purpose of the statute is 
indicative that Congress meant for the intellectual property exemption 
to include both state and federal laws.  Economic interests like all other 
intellectual property rights; drive the right of publicity the economic 
interest being the commercial value attributed to a person’s identity.  If 
ISPs are immune from liability, they are probably not going to monitor 
their websites for violations of an individual’s right of publicity.  
However, to ensure that this right is fully enforced, and that individuals 
who have put the time, effort, and money into ensuring their goodwill 
and reputation are being adequately compensated for this undertaking, 
 
94. Yakin v. Tyler Hill Corp., 566 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2009).   
95. MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2010) (search for definition of “any”). 
96. Application of Wiechert, 370 F.2d 927, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (quoting 2 Sutherland, 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4702 (3d ed. 1943)). 
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state intellectual property rights should be included in the intellectual 
property exception of the CDA. 
Further, as explained in the proposed purpose of the CDA, 
Congress seemingly realized the impossible situations ISPs, especially 
the ISPs with numerous members, were facing in managing the 
defamatory statements posted on their websites in light of the new case 
law, and sought to reconcile the situation.  At the same time, the 
legislative body realized that intellectual property laws already had 
secondary liability precedent in place that could be easily translated to 
the Internet context.  Additionally, if the intellectual property 
exemption did not exist, intellectual property rights could be violated on 
the Internet without seemingly any recourse for the owners of those 
rights, especially if violators who created those postings could not be 
found.  The intellectual property exception has created reasons for ISPs 
to monitor their sites for these types of violations and has preempted a 
possible chilling effect that could have occurred if the owners of these 
rights were to no longer receive the financial benefit of their labors. 
In determining whether the right of publicity falls under the 
proposed purposes of the intellectual property exception, it must be 
determined whether the right more closely parallels that of a privacy 
tort, like defamation, or an intellectual property right.   
First, the right of publicity and the right privacy protect 
fundamentally different underlying interests.  Under the right of 
publicity, the owner of the right possesses a commercial interest, like the 
owners of intellectual property rights.  In contrast, one does not have 
this same commercial interest under privacy rights.  An emphasis on the 
loss of commercial value is very different than an emphasis on the 
invasion of an individual’s autonomy or integrity.97  
Second, the remedies afforded are different to those who have had 
their right of publicity violated as opposed to having their privacy rights 
violated.  Typically, when there is a violation of property rights, like 
intellectual property rights, the remedy afforded is the right to exclude, 
or the issuing of an injunction against the individual violating the 
property right.98  On the other hand, when there is a violation of a 
 
97. Robert T. Thompson, Image As Personal Property: How Privacy Law Has 
Influenced the Right of Publicity, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 155, 164 (2009). 
98. Occasionally, a party will seek monetary damages for a violation of the right of 
publicity.  However, the damages one would seek under the right of privacy differ from the 
damages one would seek under the right of publicity.  The Eleventh Circuit explains: 
 “The appropriation type of invasion of privacy, like all privacy rights, centers on 
damage  
 to human dignity.  Damages are usually measured by ‘mental distress’—some bruising 
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privacy tort, like defamation, the remedy afforded is typically damages, 
not an injunction.  Since individuals typically sue for an injunction when 
their right of publicity has been violated, the right of publicity is more 
closely aligned with intellectual property rights.99  
Finally, individuals who have attained the status necessary to invoke 
the right of publicity also gain other privileges.  For example, the right 
of publicity is assignable during the individual’s life.100  Courts have 
found that without this characteristic, full commercial exploitation of 
one’s name and likeness would be practically impossible.101  The right 
can also be bequeathed, enforced by the assignee, and licensed, while 
privacy torts cannot be assigned in any capacity or inherited.102 
Therefore, for these reasons, the right of publicity is more closely 
aligned with intellectual property rights, like copyrights and trademarks, 
than with tort rights, such as defamation.  As a result, in addition to the 
plain language of the statute, the proposed purposes of the statute also 
indicate that the right of publicity should fall under § 203(e)(2) of the 
CDA.   
CONCLUSION 
As social networking sites continue to grow in size, number, and 
popularity, inevitably so too will violations of an individual’s right of 
publicity.  Without a resolution as to whether state law intellectual 
property claims, such as the right of publicity, are to be included under 
the intellectual property exemption of § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, 
confusion will continue to arise, like in the Livingston case, as to 
whether a violated individual can seek restitution against the ISP or is 
limited to seeking recourse from the individual responsible for the 
 
of  
 the human psyche.  On the other hand, the right of publicity relates to commercial 
damage  
 to the business value of human identity.  Put simplistically, while infringement of the 
right  
 of publicity looks to an injury to the pocketbook, an invasion of appropriation privacy  
 looks to an injury to the psyche.”  
Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998).  Thus, one would be 
compensated for different injuries under each of these rights, again not making them 
equivalent.   
99. See id.   
100. Haelan Labs., Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).   
101. Id.   
102. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods. Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982). 
 
2011] TWITTER OR TWEETER 255 
 
posting.   
Courts should follow Friendfinder and Atlantic Recording Corp. and 
find that intellectual property under § 230(e)(2) of the CDA includes 
both federal and state intellectual property rights.  The plain language 
indicates Congress’s intent to include any intellectual property rights.  
Additionally, if the efforts of intellectual property creators are going to 
be protected, their rights need to be enforced.  By making ISPs 
potentially liable for infringement of these rights, owners of intellectual 
property rights will get the protection they deserve.  Further, the right of 
publicity has the same fundamental underlying interest, typically 
invokes the same remedies, and gives the owner the same privileges, 
such as assignably and inheritability, as other intellectual property 
rights.  These factors demonstrate that the right of publicity more 
closely reflects an intellectual property right, rather than a privacy tort.  
Therefore, the right of publicity should be included in the intellectual 
property exemption of § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, and ISPs should be held 
liable if their users post contents on their websites that violate this right.   
KRISTINA M. SESEK* 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
2008 magna cum lade, Carroll University, Waukesha, Wisconsin.  I would like to thank my 
parents and friends for always believing in me and for their constant support, patience, and 
encouragement throughout this law school journey.  I would also like to thank Professors 
Bruce Boyden and Michael O’Hear for their guidance, feedback, and advice in writing this 
Comment.  
